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Criminalizing dissent in the ‘War on Terror’: The British state’s reaction to the Gaza war protests of 2008-2009​[1]​

Nadifa, Hakim and Yusuf
On the evening of 23rd March 2009, Nadifa, a twenty-four year-old Somali woman, and her husband Hakim, went to bed at their home in an apartment block on a busy London high street. Nadifa’s nineteen year old brother, Yusuf, who had been staying with the couple for the past few weeks, was sleeping in the next room. In the early hours of the following morning, at around 5am, Nadifa and her husband were awoken by the sound of a door being kicked open and load screams coming from a nearby flat. Moments later, the couple became aware that someone had broken down their own front door and heard footsteps coming up the stairs towards their bedroom. Nadifa and her husband began to scream and heard the screams of Yusuf coming from the nearby room. The couple then saw their bedroom door fly open and around ten to fifteen men, some in plain clothes and some in police uniform, burst into the room, dragged the couple to the floor and handcuffed them. Nadifa described what happened next:

I was in shock, we didn’t know what to do because we didn’t know who they were, so we were just screaming ... I asked them why they were there and they said ‘we can’t tell you at this point’. My husband was saying ‘how can you not tell us?’, and they said ‘we can’t tell you in case you try to hide any kind of evidence’, we said ‘how can we hide anything if you’re keeping us handcuffed?’, but they just ignored us. I asked them whether I could be covered because I felt uncomfortable with all these men in the house. I was in my night clothes and I wanted to wear something longer. I’m a Muslim and I usually wear a scarf, so I felt even more uncomfortable. But when I asked them they said ‘not now, not now, you might be a threat, you might be hiding something’. I didn’t know my rights. Eventually one of the police officers gave me an old piece of cloth he had found in the house and I used it to cover my head. Most of the police were in the living room with my brother, but I couldn’t speak to him and they didn’t tell us what was going on … eventually they said that they were there for my brother but they didn’t tell us until an hour afterwards, after they had finished searching the house. I assumed it was something really, really big (Interview, 15/07/2009).

This whole episode lasted around two and a half hours, during which time the police thoroughly searched the couple’s home, seizing shoes, clothing, paperwork and mobile phones belonging to Nadifa and her brother. When the police eventually found Nadifa’s laptop computer they demanded to know whether her brother had ever used it. Nadifa explained that the laptop was hers and she only used it for her university work. She asked why they were interested in her computer and was shocked by the response: 

They said they wanted to know whether my brother had been looking at any terrorist material, or whether he was part of any terrorist network. That was bizarre because [Yusuf] has nothing to do with terrorism, my brother doesn’t even know his own religion very well.

After the search had finished, the police arrested Yusuf who had been handcuffed in the next room, leaving Nadifa and her husband in their badly damaged home. Yusuf was taken to a police station, where he was questioned by police officers, in the absence of a solicitor, about his political and religious beliefs. The arrest has had a lasting effect on Nadifa and her family: 

I don’t feel that I have a private life at all after that, it was really embarrassing, especially not wearing anything as a woman with many men being there, it was an awful experience. And the way they came into the house, not telling us what was going on, handcuffing people who had nothing to do with it, was even worse. I feel like I was assaulted.

Unbeknown to the family at the time, and indeed until many months later, the experience of Nadifa, Hakim and Yusuf was being repeated in the homes of Muslim families across the UK. During the following months, a total of 169 people were arrested in a series of these aggressive dawn raids, as part of a policing operation codenamed ‘Operation Ute’ (FOI 2011). The arrests followed the publication of police press releases containing CCTV images of ‘wanted’ men, most of Asian appearance, together with a large-scale police surveillance operation which involved tracking the movements and associations of suspects over a number of days and weeks. Another of these ‘wanted’ men, Mohammed, became aware that the police were pursuing him when his photograph was printed on the front page of his local newspaper. He later discovered that his image had been included in Scotland Yard’s ‘Top 10 Most Wanted’ list, prompting one national tabloid newspaper to label him an ‘Islam convert’ and ‘suspected Muslim fanatic’ who was ‘wanted by cops’. The newspaper claimed Mohammed had made ‘chilling references to death’ on the social networking website Facebook, declaring himself ‘Muslim first before anything’ and expressing ‘support for the Palestinians’ (Hughes 2009). Mohammed, who has suffered serious mental health problems since his arrest, described his reaction when he discovered the police were pursuing him:

I was in shock, I was really, really scared, they’d made me look like a fanatic, a lunatic, I was thinking ‘what’s going to happen to me?’, I was absolutely terrified’ (Interview, 28/05/2010).

The experiences of these families mirror those of many of the over 1,800 people arrested in connection with terrorism offences in Britain since September 11th 2001, an overwhelming 92 percent of which have failed to result in successful prosecution under counter-terrorism legislation (Carlile 2010). Unbelievably, however, none of those arrested in this series of dawn raids were arrested in connection with involvement in domestic or international terrorism. Nor were they accused of inciting, glorifying, financing or conspiring to commit any of the wide-ranging terrorist-related offences that have been introduced in Britain during the last decade. Instead, what united those arrested as part of this policing operation, in addition to being young and Muslim, was that they had attended at least one of a series of political demonstrations in response to the Israeli state’s devastating military assault on the Gaza strip earlier that year. 

From Operation Cast Lead to Operation Ute
On 27th December 2008, Israeli forces launched ‘Operation Cast Lead’, a three-week military incursion on the Gaza Strip, resulting in the death of over 1,400 Palestinians and injured thousands more (Goldstone 2009). This attack by the world’s fourth largest military power on a largely defenceless civilian population triggered a wave of protests, vigils and occupations throughout the world, culminating in the UK in the largest demonstration in support of the Palestinian people in British history. Despite the majority of British Muslims have little or no connection to the occupied territories (Peach 2005), the three weeks of conflict in Gaza provoked tens of thousands of people from Britain’s Muslim communities to take to the streets, voicing their opposition to both the Israeli incursion and the British Government’s apparent complacently at the suffering of the Palestinian people. From the day Israel launched its first air strike on the Gaza Strip, pro-Palestinian protesters held a nightly vigil outside of the Israeli Embassy in London (Gillan 2008). Organized by a coalition of groups in opposition to the conflict​[2]​ and beginning with a few hundred people, as the strength of public opposition to the Israeli offensive intensified the protests rapidly grew in size, forcing the closure of a number of streets surrounding the Embassy by the start of the New Year (Bowcott 2009). At the same time, a wave of student protests began to spread across the UK, with students at 16 universities occupying management buildings and lecture theatres, demanding university divestment from companies which support arms to Israel and a boycott of Israeli goods (Lipsett and Benjamin 2009). At the forefront of many of the protests and campaigns were young Muslim women, many of whom had not attended a political demonstration in the past, taking a central role in organizing, stewarding and speaking at demonstrations. There they were joined by trade unionists, faith groups and peace campaigners, representing the biggest surge in the anti-war movement since the mass protests against the prospect of a US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

The police responded to these protests with violent policing on a scale that had not been seen in the UK for over a decade (Gilmore 2010). While pro-Palestinian protesters in Egypt, Jordan and Syria were beaten back with batons and tear gas (Jordan 2008), protesters in London were greeted at the Israeli Embassy by scores of riot police fully equipped with dogs, horses, batons and long shields. As the protests grew in size the level of policing intensified dramatically. During the first national demonstration in London on 3rd January 2009, a group of around 5,000 protesters en route to the Israeli Embassy were diverted by police into an underpass near Hyde Park. Once inside, hidden from the view of the world’s media, the march was brought to a standstill and lines of police officers were ordered to charge into the crowd. Scores of protesters were injured as those inside the tunnel tried desperately to escape: 

There was a stampede of people walking towards the back of the tunnel, trying to get out … people were panicking, screaming, falling over, there were people who fell over and were buried under three or four people, it was really scary … it was absolutely sickening, you just thought, ‘this isn’t going to end until someone dies’ (Interview with protester injured inside Hyde Park Underpass on 3 January 2009, 7/7/2009). 

The following week, as the Palestinian death toll continued to rise, an estimated 100,000 people took part in a mass demonstration in central London (Quinn and Smith 2009). ​[3]​ As the march surged past the Israeli Embassy protesters threw shoes at the gates, in a symbolic echo of the Iraqi journalist who threw his shoes at former US-President George W. Bush (Pilkington 2008). Suddenly and without warning, scores of riot and mounted police who had assembled inside the Embassy grounds charged into the crowd. Protesters described fears of meeting a ‘Hillsborough-style death’​[4]​ as police tried to hold up metal barriers to prevent people escaping onto the side streets: 

There was a sudden panic, a big swell, all the crash barriers got knocked over, people fell to the floor. People began to panic, especially people with children … The police did a charge and then pulled back, and then did another charge and pulled back, just intimidating people. People were just standing around, totally disorientated and worried for their safety (Interview with Muslim Safety Forum steward, 22/7/2009). 

As the closing rally came to an end, thousands of men, women and children were held indiscriminately in freezing temperatures inside police cordons, where they were subject to periodic baton charges by police. In response, some protesters began to throw placards and bottles towards the gates of the Embassy and the windows of a Starbucks café were broken. Protesters were eventually released on the condition that they provide their name, address, date of birth and have their photograph taken by police intelligence gatherers. Those of ‘Asian’ (i.e South Asian) appearance were reportedly searched and questioned in much greater numbers than their white counterparts. Protesters and journalists attempting to film police actions were detained under counter-terrorism powers and twenty people were arrested by teams of police ‘snatch squads’. Jalil, a British-born Muslim, was arrested while attempting to leave the demonstration on suspicion of assaulting a police officer − an alleged crime for which he was subsequently acquitted:

I was jumped on, kicked, punched, thrown on the floor and handcuffed. I was in complete shock…[The police officer] was pulling the handcuffs to make me feel pain and when I complained about the pain he said, ‘I’ll teach you about pain, I’ll teach you a lesson you prick, I know your kind’ … One of the police officers started taunting me and asking me questions like, ‘Where were you born?’ and I said, ‘I’m British’, but he said, ‘you’re not British, you don’t have respect for this country, you don’t understand the laws of this country’, I said ‘I told you I’m British’, and he said ‘this is the Queen’s country and you should obey our rules’ (Interview, 23/2/2010).

‘Saddamites’ and ‘wannabe jihadists’
This notion that Muslims and Islam are somehow antithetical to ‘British’ cultural practices echoed much of the racist hysteria surrounding sharia law that had featured heavily in media and political commentary for much of the previous year. In February 2008, the fiercely anti-Muslim Daily Express newspaper called on Muslims who wish to be regarded as ‘true Britons’ to reject their ‘unpatriotic’ practices and ‘accept the law of the land’: ‘Muslims who don’t should go and find another country with a culture more to their taste.’ (Daily Express 2009). Similarly racialised constructions of Muslims as alien ‘others’ went on to characterise the media’s response to the Gaza war protests, with increasingly lurid stories of  ‘chaos and bloodshed’ on the streets of London as thousands of protesters ‘battled with riot police’ outside the Israeli Embassy (Silvester 2009). Although some of the broadsheet newspapers reported allegations of brutality on the part of the police (see e.g. Dodd 2009a, McVeigh and Quinn 2009, Dugan, Miles and Osley 2009), the indignation of tabloid journalists was reserved exclusively for the ‘illegitimate’ actions of protesters, often repeating verbatim the official police account of the demonstrations. The Daily Mail blamed the disorder on ‘extremists’, consisting of ‘coachloads of Muslim youths with Pakistani origins’ who had been ‘driven from Yorkshire and the Midlands’ to cause ‘anarchist mayhem’ (Wright and Drake 2009), while the Evening Standard described a violent ‘rampage’ by an ‘angry mob’ who had ‘ransacked businesses’ causing ‘hundreds of thousands of pounds of damage’ (Blunden and Razaq 2009). As Jonathan Evan, head of MI5, warned that anger over the Israeli incursion could have repercussions for national security by giving extremists in Britain ‘more ideological ammunition’ (Norton-Taylor 2009), the Sun predicted a ‘violent Islamic backlash in Britain’ as a direct result of the conflict (Phillips 2009). According to Daily Mail columnist Richard Littlejohn, the protests represented an attempt by ‘the hard-Left and militant Islamists’ to ‘bring the Gaza war to the streets of London’. Contrasting the ‘mayhem’ outside the Israeli Embassy with the ‘restrained, dignified pro-Israeli rally’ taking place at Trafalgar Square, Littlejohn claimed:

This has less to do with the Palestinian cause and everything to do with the global jihad and Iranian-sponsored terrorism aimed at wiping Israel off the face of the Earth … It’s the usual crowd of Trotskyite boot boys, Saddamites and bussed-in wannabe jihadists, spoiling for a fight and an excuse to kick a few coppers. (Littlejohn 2009).

On 22nd January 2009 London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) issued a press release appealing for information to help trace over forty people suspected of involvement in ‘violence and aggression’ during the Gaza demonstrations (MPS 2009). According to Commander Bob Broadhurst, head of the force’s public order unit, those wanted by police consisted of a ‘small hardcore’ who acted as ‘antagonists’ during the demonstrations, ‘attacking police and smashing shop windows’ and ‘stirring up others within the crowd’. In stark contrast to the account given by those attending the protests, Broadhurst (who was later forced to apologise for giving false information to MPs during an inquiry into the policing of the G20 protests in London: Woodcock 2011) claimed that his officers had ‘worked hard to facilitate to the march to keep participants safe [sic]’ while the embassy and police officers came under ‘sustained attack’ from an unruly crowd: ‘The Met will not tolerate attacks on officers under the guise of protest. Our right to protest is an important one and should never be undermined by thugs and louts who simply want to cause trouble’ (MPS 2009). Included in the press release were a number of CCTV snapshots of those who were ‘wanted’ in connection with the police investigation. These images were given wide-scale publicity when they were printed on the front pages of a number of local and national newspapers, which reproduced without question the police account of the protesters as violent and the police response as proportionate (see e.g. Davenport 2009, Hackney Gazette 2009). 

The publicity led to the arrest of 169 people and the start of what was to become one of the most significant series of criminal cases in over a decade. Of those arrested, 78 were charged with offences; 65 with at least one count of ‘Violent Disorder’, a broadly-drafted public order offence introduced in the wake of the 1984 miners’ strike carrying a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment (FOI 2010, 2011)​[5]​. In contrast to the very mixed demographic of the protests, almost all of those selected for prosecution were from Muslim backgrounds. Some 67 per cent were aged 21 or under at the time of the demonstrations (the youngest was only 12) and all but four were male. The majority had no previous convictions and had been attending their first ever political demonstration. Having been warned by police that a request for legal advice would substantially increase their time held in custody, some of those arrested agreed to be interviewed in the absence of a solicitor. Although none were formally arrested in connection with terrorism offences, many were questioned extensively on their political and religious beliefs. The police demanded the names of any friends and family members who had accompanied them to the demonstrations, some of which went on to be arrested in subsequent raids. In February 2009, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) confirmed that groups involved in the Gaza war protests had been targeted by the secretive ‘Confidential Intelligence Unit’, established in 1999 to coordinate surveillance and infiltration of ‘domestic extremists’ (Milne 2009).

The Bradford effect: ‘Muslim riots’ and ‘deterrent’ sentencing
For the vast majority of the arrested protesters and their lawyers, it was not until the cases finally reached the packed West London courthouse in October 2009 and defendants were one at a time called before the District Judge to enter their plea that the scale of the policing operation became apparent. In a troubling parallel to the Bradford riot cases of 2001, the majority of those charged appeared individually and were represented by separate lawyers, only a small minority of whom had significant experience of handling serious charges of public disorder. Acting on the advice from lawyers that an early guilty plea would be likely to result in a non-custodial sentence, a staggering 72 per cent of those charged pleaded guilty to the serious indictments against them, denying the opportunity to mount a collective defence or to contest the police account in court. When lawyers were eventually granted access to the footage relevant to their client’s case, they were asked to sign an undertaking that they would not disclose any of the footage to anyone other than their client. This initial segregation of protesters, who were arrested and charged individually following night-time raids and represented by over thirty different law firms, undoubtedly contributed to reluctance of defendants to take their cases to trial, leading some defence solicitors to conclude that this was a deliberate strategy on the part of the police: 

People were raided individually, it was very isolating, and it was kept quiet … Normally the police are very proud of the number of arrests they make and are shouting out about it, but they were very clever here, it was a very planned operation of individual arrests … There were individuals who were young, Muslim, and who did not have a clear connection with an organization being picked off, often not represented [by a lawyer]. This leads to confessions through fear and isolation in the courts (Interview with criminal defence solicitor, 6/7/2010).

As the hearings came to an end, the judge took the unprecedented step of concluding that these cases had an ‘international element’ (a term with no legal meaning) and imposed bail conditions which required protesters to surrender passports and not apply for travel documents without the leave of the Court. Although almost all of those charged were British citizens, protesters were indiscriminately served with immigration notices stating that they could be deported depending on the outcome of the criminal proceedings. When those convicted of offences eventually returned to court to receive their punishment​[6]​, friends and family who had packed into the court’s public gallery broke down in tears as the judge announced that he had decided to pass lengthy sentences of imprisonment which would serve as a ‘deterrent’ to others, citing as authority the precedent set in the Bradford riot cases of 2001.​[7]​ Relying almost exclusively on the carefully edited CCTV footage presented by police, the judge disregarded the advice of the Probation Service in their Pre-Sentence Reports, which had recommended without exception a non-custodial sentence as an appropriate level of punishment. In a carefully worded judgment which echoed much of Judge Gullick’s infamous ‘tariff setting’ statement in the Bradford cases, Judge Denniss concluded:

Although the Court must have regard to the individual defendant’s personal characteristics and actual involvement, the sentence must also reflect the effect of the violent disorder on the public who would have been caused real anxiety and distress. It is not just the individual conduct of a single offender which is important, it is the nature of the offending as a whole. Every individual who takes part by their deed or encouragement is guilty of an offence. Everyone who takes part does so at their peril a deterrent sentence is necessary. The public are entitled to look to the law for protection.

Those wearing over their faces the Palestinian ‘Keffiyeh’ scarf, a powerful symbol of resistance for opponents of the conflict, were handed down increased sentences as punishment for their attempts to ‘conceal their identity’. Two boys, both aged 16 when the protests took place, received 12-month sentences for their part in causing damage to a Starbucks café while two women aged 18 and 19 were sent to prison for 15 months. A 21-year-old student was given a 12month jail term for throwing a single bottle towards the gates of the Israeli Embassy, while a 17-year-old boy was sentenced to 30 months in a Young Offenders Institution for throwing ‘missiles’ (wooden placards and plastic bottles) towards police lines. In total, 54people were convicted and 29 sent to prison for between two months and two and a half years. Almost all had entered guilty pleas at the earliest available opportunity and most had no previous convictions. None were alleged to have caused any direct injury to a police officer or member of the public. 

The rigour with which those singled out by the police as criminal suspects were pursued was in stark contrast to the way allegations of criminal wrongdoing on the part of the police were handled by the authorities. Despite the severity of the 33official complaints about the policing of the demonstrations, none have been fully investigated by the Independent Police Complaints Commission and all of those referred back to the Metropolitan Police for local investigation were subsequently dismissed (FOI 2009a, 2009b). At least two of the most serious complaints were dismissed after the officer who assaulted the protester could not be identified as they had deliberately concealed their ID number. Dissatisfied with the police’s handling of the official complaints, a small number of injured protesters decided to pursue civil actions against the police and in July 2010, the Metropolitan Police finally agreed an out of court settlement of £25,000 with two brothers struck on the head by police truncheons outside the Israeli Embassy on the 3rd January 2009. Despite an admission from the Metropolitan Police of unjustified use of force, however, no police officer has faced criminal charges as a result of their behaviour at the Gaza demonstrations. Ray, a 79-year-old veteran peace campaigner knocked unconscious outside the Israeli Embassy after being struck on the head by a police shield, described those responsible as ‘absolutely vicious, totally irresponsible, arrogant and racist’ (Interview, 4/8/2009).

Shoe throwing and ‘political correctness’
For much of the media, the severity of sentences legitimized the earlier hysteria surrounding the protests, reinforcing the racialized construction of the protesters as dangerous ‘others’ who pose a volatile threat to the security of the state. Although many of the news reports highlighted that the majority of those convicted were from Muslim backgrounds, they did so without reference to the controversy surrounding the police’s decision to target young Muslims out of the very diverse group of people who took part in these demonstrations or the exceptional way the cases were handled by the courts. This portrayal of defendants as Muslim ‘extremists’ rather than legitimate protesters intensified following the revelation that one of those singled out for arrest happened to be the son of infamous jailed Muslim cleric Abu Hamza − a consistent figure of tabloid hate for much of the last decade. Although the connection between the hook-handed folk devil and student protester predictably attracted significant media attention, the court remarkably refused to grant anonymity to the defendant, dismissing submissions from his defence lawyers that his relationship with his father could prejudice his case. Unconstrained by reporting restrictions, the 20-year-old’s name, address and photograph were published in the press alongside photographs of his ‘hate preacher’ father. Following his predictable conviction, a lengthy article published in the Daily Mail, headed ‘Hate Cleric’s Son Locked Up for Riot Attacks on Police’, described in detail the prosecution’s account of the part he played in the ‘violent clashes’ at the ‘anti-Israel riots’ (Camber 2010). The article was accompanied by a series of unrelated claims about the level of ‘huge benefit payments’ Hamza’s family have enjoyed whilst ‘living off the state’ at the expense of the taxpayer. In April 2010, another remarkable story published on the front page of the Sunday Times claimed that London’s Metropolitan Police had ‘bowed to Islamic sensitivities’ by allowing Muslims ‘to throw shoes in ritual protest – which could have the unintended consequence of politicians or the police being hit’. The article referred to the case of a 21-year-old student charged in relation to the Gaza protests who, it maintained, was ‘almost certain to avoid a prison sentence’ as a result of the police’s ‘concession’ towards Muslim protesters. In reality, the CPS decision not to include an alleged incident of shoe throwing in a charge of violent disorder was based entirely on the quality of the CCTV evidence, rather than any exceptional ‘concession’ towards Muslim protesters. Nevertheless, familiar populist attacks on multiculturalism and ‘political correctness’ continued to dominate over any sober analysis of the exceptional way these cases were being handled by the authorities. 

Resisting deviant identities
Hall et al.’s (1978) ‘spiral of signification’ analysis presents a reciprocal relationship between the media and other institutions of social control such as the police and the courts, whereby particular events constructed by the media as signifying wider problems of social crisis justify a disproportionate response from the state, which in turn serves to expand repressive mechanisms of social control and reinforce existing social and political order. From the repressive protest policing tactics and exceptional counter-terrorism measures, though to the public ‘man-hunt’, mass dawn raid arrests, severe criminal charges, onerous bail conditions and lengthy prison sentences, all of those selected for punishment for their involvement in the Gaza war protests were subjected to a disproportionate response from the state at every stage of the criminal justice process. This was a response fuelled by media constructions of Muslims as an inherently ‘suspect’ community and legitimized by a political discourse which presents ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ as the predominant threat to the Western liberal democracies (Fekete 2004, Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). Far from being exclusively repressive, however, Garland notes the mobilizing and politicizing effects moral panics can have on their ‘deviant’ subjects, causing the basis of panic ‘to be halted, amplified or altogether transformed’ (2008: 14, see also McRobbie and Thornton 1995). In January 2009, a packed public meeting in Parliament called by the protest organizers and attended by hundreds of activists, lawyers, defendants and their families demanded the immediate release of all convicted protesters from prison and that the charges be dropped against those still facing trial. The following week, a national defence campaign was formed to coordinate liaison between lawyers, offer support for defendants and their families and generate public awareness of the disproportionate treatment of the arrested protesters. The campaign launched a public petition which went on to receive over 2,000 signatures and organized protests outside of some of the remaining court hearings. The response generated considerable media attention (see e.g. Taylor 2010, Hattenstone and Taylor 2010, Alibhai-Brown 2010), significantly shifting the debate away from the initial moral panic which focused on the dominant police narrative towards the disproportionate response from the state. Those protesters that were supported by their lawyers to challenge the evidence against them were remarkably successful. At the time of writing, a staggering 14 out of the 16 cases where not guilty pleas have been maintained have resulted in acquittal. Many of the cases collapsed following persistent requests form lawyers for the disclosure of police material. In March 2010 a 23-year-old protester was acquitted after his lawyer discovered undisclosed police footage which clearly showed him beaten to the ground by police officers in an unprovoked attack. The case raised serious questions about the validity of the police’s account of protesters as the instigators of violence and the reliability of the testimony of individual officers. Between March and July 2010, 14 of the 29 cases where custodial sentences had been imposed were taken to the Court of Appeal. The first appeal saw a 19-year-old woman immediately released from prison in the ‘interests of justice and mercy’.​[8]​ During the following hearings, one 12month sentence was quashed while two others were reduced to the time already served in custody. The remainder of the sentences were reduced by between three and 18 months. The Court, however, steadfastly refused to condemn the trial judge’s decision to impose ‘deterrent’ sentences and the majority of the protesters remained in prison.

Criminalizing dissent in the ‘War on ‘Terror’
The Gaza war triggered a level of political mobilization from within Britain’s Muslim communities not seen since the mass demonstrations over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, when united action between Muslims and non-Muslims provided a powerful antidote to the ‘clash of civilizations’ rhetoric that had come to characterize the dominate discourse surrounding the globalized ‘War on Terror’ and the imperialist military intervention which became its defining feature (Poynting and Mason 2007, Bonnett 2004). Yaqoob (2003) has further argued that the collaboration of Muslims with the wider anti-war movement played in important role in ‘helping Muslims to move away from the confining and further marginalizing position of constantly being on the defensive’, as well serving to isolate ‘extreme’ Islamic groups who opposed working with non-Muslims (see also Alam 2003). The racist backlash against Muslims provoked by the London bombings of 7 July 2005, however, placed Muslim groups working within the wider anti-war movement under increasing pressure to retreat from an ‘over-politicized’ position. In December 2005 the leadership of the Muslim Association of Britain, one of the key groups involved in organizing the mass mobilizations against the Iraq war in 2003, lost control of the organization in response to growing internal fears that the group’s anti-war activities ‘had pitted it too publicly and forcefully against the British establishment’ (Phillips 2008: 107). At the same time, student Islamic Societies and Palestinian solidarity groups have come under increasingly intrusive levels of surveillance from the authorities (Mohammed 2010). In March 2009, as the police were busy tracking down young Muslim men and women who had attended protests outside the Israeli Embassy, the British government suspended links with Britain’s largest Muslim organization, the Muslim Council of Britain, when it refused government demands to sack one of its leading members after he signed a statement calling upon Muslims to resist Israeli aggression in the Middle East (Dodd 2009b). Indeed, as the British state’s overreaction to the Gaza war protests demonstrates, where critique is directed towards Israel, a key ally in the US-led ‘War on Terror’, the response has been particularly authoritarian - a pattern consistent with state crackdowns following anti-Israel protests across the globe. As protesters in Britain were being rounded up by police, 180 people were arrested following a rally of over 30,000 people in Paris while police in Norway used tear gas to disperse protesters outside the Israeli Embassy in Oslo (Rising 2009).The ferocity with which those singled out for their part in the Gaza war protests were pursued and punished by the state was thus fuelled by a continuous cycle of moral panic constructing Muslims as a pervasive ‘threat’ to the West and legitimized by an establishment political discourse which presents the engagement of Muslims within broader political movements as illegitimate. Whilst those Muslim groups who support government practices are labeled as ‘moderate’ and rewarded with significant financial gain, those who criticize it are isolated as ‘extremist’ and subject to intrusive levels of state surveillance and criminalization (Kundnani 2009). In an attempt to depoliticize Muslims and restrict radical dissent, Muslims are constructed as dangerous ‘outsiders’, to be excluded from political engagement other than that which is proscribed to them by the state. Whether intentional or not, the state’s disproportionate response to the Gaza war protests has sent a powerful message to Muslims, and young Muslims in particular, that their engagement in political activity will not be tolerated. An Imam from a mosque where three of the imprisoned protesters attended described the frustration of young men and women in his community following the arrests:
We noticed how angry they were, they don’t trust the police, they feel that police are not fair with them, no cooperating with them, they feel the media is not giving the right picture about them, and what is happening with the massacres in Gaza. So that makes them boil from inside, and the reaction of the people who are boiling from inside, without giving them the right and facilitating their right to demonstrate, can be very dangerous (Interview, 21/7/2009).
‘Is it because he is Muslim’?
Although some of those targeted by the police under Operation Ute were undoubtedly politicized by their experiences, this has not been a universal effect. Some have instead become intensely withdrawn, finding it difficult to leave the house or speak to anyone outside of their immediate family. Those attempting to secure jobs and university places on release from prison have predictably found a conviction for violent disorder and lengthy jail sentence to be a significant barrier. Many have sworn never to attend a political demonstration again. What is clear, however, is that the impact has gone far beyond those arrested and incarcerated. Speaking following the release from prison of his son, Kabir, a father described the devastating impact the case has had on his entire family:

The atmosphere changed in the house completely. My wife was crying all the time, depressed all the time … it was so stressful.  She didn’t want to cry in front of him but at night she cried ... I used to smile a lot but not now. People at work asked me what was wrong, but at first I was ashamed to say that my son had been to court and put in prison, so I didn’t tell anybody at the beginning. The stress affected my daughters also − my eldest daughter had to take a year out of her studies because she couldn’t sleep. There were a lot of arguments in the family because of the stress. You can see that there is a sense of unhappiness in the family, a sense that a disaster has happened, a disaster that needs settling. And although [Kabir] is out now, still not everything is settled, we are still thinking about the future. Of course we are not used to this so it upset us a lot. Also for me, it was the sense of injustice hurting me, I feel a lot this sense of injustice, about why this should happen to him. Usually you would not be put in prison for this − why was he? Is it because he is Muslim? That is hurting me a lot (Interview, 11/6/2010).
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^1	  This chapter is based on an extensive ethnographic study of the protests and their aftermath, including interviews with protest organisers, stewards, protesters, family members, lawyers, probation officers and religious leaders;  participant observation at protests, court hearings and defence campaign meetings and an analysis of administrative data including legal case-files, Freedom of Information Act disclosures, police press releases, newspaper reports, defence campaign documents including film and photograph material and witness statements. All field work was carried out by the author between January 2009 and January 2011. All names appearing in the chapter are pseudonyms.
^2	  Stop the War (STW), Palestinian Solidarity Campaign (PSC), British Muslim Initiative (BMI), Palestinian Forum in Britain (PFB) and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).
^3	  The author attended the march and rally as a participant observer.
^4	  On 15 April 1989, 96 men, women and children were killed and hundreds injured during a crush at the Hillsborough football stadium in Sheffield, England. The 1989 Taylor Report identified police mismanagement of the crowd as the main reason for the disaster. See Scraton (2009).
^5	  Public Order Act 1986, s2.
^6	  Cases took on average one year and two months from the protest date to conclude with some protesters having to wait over two years to discover their fate.
^7	  Following the Bradford riots of 2001, 307 people were arrested and 256 charged with offences. Of these, 231 people were convicted and 187 sent to prison for an average of 4 years and 6 months. Most were charged with the more serious offence of Riot (Public Order Act 1986, s1). For a detailed discussion of criminal charges brought following the Bradford riots see Carling et al. (2004).
^8	  R v Lahouidek [2010] EWCA Crim 738 at 13.				
